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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze countries’ optimal policies 
regarding intervention in international emissions trading and 
implementation of environmental taxes when ancillary benefits of 
abatement are considered. We construct a model in which we combine 
both tradable emission permits and pollution taxes. We use a two-country 
model and in each country there is one firm. These countries are the only 
suppliers on the international market of a commodity produced by their 
firms which compete a-la Cournot.  What it is examined in this paper is 
the interaction between governments (strategic trade) and the effects on 
firms’ outputs and emissions. 
The results prove that governments’ intervention policies are 
affected by the consideration of ancillary benefits. The imposition of the 
taxes also leads countries to act strategically in the international market. 
In order to support these results we present in a section a numerical point 
of view. More specifically, we set values to the parameters and thus we 
take numerical results of the variables we use in the model. The 
numerical outcome verifies the reaction functions. In addition, we create 
a figure so that to have a visual point of view. The downward reaction 
functions of the taxes are presented on the graph and their segment shows 
that there is a solution to the problem. 
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Σύνοψη 
O σκοπός της εργασίας αυτής είναι να αναλύσει τις άριστες 
πολιτικές των χωρών όσον αφορά την παρέµβαση στο διεθνές εµπόριο 
εκποµπών ρύπων και την επιβολή περιβαλλοντικών φόρων, όταν 
λαµβάνονται υπόψη τα δευτερεύοντα οφέλη της µείωσης των ρύπων. 
Κατασκευάζουµε ένα µοντέλο στο οποίο συνδυάζουµε τις µεταβιβάσιµες 
άδειες εκποµπών ρύπων µε τους περιβαλλοντικούς φόρους. 
Χρησιµοποιούµε ένα µοντέλο µε 2 χώρες, όπου σε κάθε χώρα υπάρχει 
µία επιχείρηση. Αυτές οι χώρες είναι οι µοναδικοί προµηθευτές στην 
διεθνή αγορά ενός προϊόντος που παράγεται από τις εταιρίες τους οι 
οποίες βρίσκονται σε ανταγωνισµό τύπου Cournot. Αυτό που εξετάζεται 
στην παρούσα εργασία είναι η αλληλεπίδραση µεταξύ των κυβερνήσεων 
(στρατηγικό εµπόριο) και τα αποτελέσµατα της στην παραγωγή του 
προϊόντος και στις εκποµπές ρύπων των εταιρειών. 
Τα αποτελέσµατα αποδεικνύουν ότι οι παρεµβατικές πολιτικές των 
κυβερνήσεων επηρεάζονται από την αναγνώριση των δευτερευόντων 
οφελών. Επίσης, η επιβολή των φόρων οδηγεί τις χώρες να δρουν 
στρατηγικά στην διεθνή αγορά. Για να υποστηρίξουµε τα αποτελέσµατα 
µας παρουσιάζουµε µια αριθµητική εικόνα των πραγµάτων. Ειδικότερα, 
θέτουµε τιµές στις παραµέτρους ούτως ώστε να λάβουµε αριθµητικά 
αποτελέσµατα για τις µεταβλητές που χρησιµοποιούµε στο µοντέλο. Το 
αριθµητικό αποτέλεσµα επαληθεύει τις συναρτήσεις αντίδρασης 
(κάλλιστης απόκρισης). Επιπλέον, κατασκευάζουµε ένα διάγραµµα ώστε 
να έχουµε και µια οπτική εικόνα. Οι καµπύλες αντίδρασης των φόρων 
που παρουσιάζονται στο διάγραµµα είναι αρνητικής κλίσης και η τοµή 
τους αποδεικνύει ότι υπάρχει λύση στο πρόβληµα µας. 
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1. Introduction 
Transboundary pollution is related with many important 
environmental problems urgently calling for solution. Problems like 
ozone depletion, climate change and marine pollution have been the main 
subjects of negotiations among countries over the last two decades. 
Because of the high priority that environmental problems have received at 
the policy level it is not surprising that there is at the theoretical front a 
growing effort to analyze international environmental agreements (IEAs). 
In this study we present an analysis based on imperfect competition 
to find out if the consideration of ancillary benefits (or co-benefits) 
affects these agreements. More specifically we try to calculate the level of 
the tax that each government will impose by maximizing its social 
welfare while taking into account the ancillary benefits and the behavior 
of the other governments. We further calculate the optimal level of output 
that each firm produces. Initially, we present a general view of the 
environmental problems and their influence on the economic activity. 
Environmental problems are often international by nature. Threats to 
our environment caused by climate change, loss of biological diversity or 
pollution of the marine environment are examples of problems which can 
only be solved through cooperation between the countries. In order to 
overcome these problems international environmental agreements are 
signed between countries. The most important of these agreements is the 
Kyoto Protocol signed in February 2005 for the commitment period of 
2008-2012. However, many countries are reluctant to sign such 
agreements because these agreements are against to their interest. 
This behavior may change when ancillary benefits (or co-benefits) 
are taken into account. They are local benefits generated by climate 
policy, but are not associated directly with the slowing of climate change. 
The consideration of ancillary benefits leads to the implementation of 
environmental taxes by the governments. The permits distributed 
according to agreements like the Kyoto Protocol are not sufficient to 
achieve the environmental target and thus governments tax the emissions. 
Except for the reduction of the emissions, the implementation of the 
environmental taxes may also lead governments to act strategically. “If 
imperfect competition is an important characteristic of some international 
markets, then firms in these markets may earn pure profits. Protection can 
shift some of this profit from foreign to domestic firms, and in addition, 
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tariffs can transfer foreign rents to the domestic treasury in the form of 
tariff revenue”, as Brander and Spencer (1984) note. 
In our study we try to testify the impact of the ancillary benefits and 
the environmental taxes on the strategic behavior of the governments. 
Thus, in our model we combine two instruments to implement an 
emission constraint: pollution taxes and tradable emission permits. We 
also consider ancillary benefits and the cost of abatement. In order to 
support our results, we set values to the parameters. We find out that, 
indeed, ancillary benefits and environmental taxes affect the strategic 
behavior of the governments. More specifically, ancillary benefits lead to 
the reduction of the taxes. Moreover, there is a negative relation between 
the taxes imposed by the two countries. 
In section 2 we present the various international environmental 
problems raised mainly by the emissions of air pollutants. In section 3 we 
analyze the international environmental agreements signed in order to 
tackle these problems. Section 4 extends the analysis to the ancillary 
benefits and section 5 to the strategic trade. Section 6 sets out the model, 
while section 7 shows the behavior of the governments and the firms with 
the use of reaction functions. In section 8 we use simulations to verify the 
results of section 7. Finally, section 9 contains concluding remarks. 
Our study is similar to Pratlong (2005). In both studies two 
instruments are used to implement an emission constraint: pollution taxes 
and tradable emission permits (TEP). The difference is that while 
Pratlong (2005) is concerned with the choice of these two instruments, in 
this study they are implemented simultaneously. 
This study is also similar to Brander and Spencer (1985). B&S 
(1985) are concerned with strategic trade and the behavior of the 
governments (subsidies on firms’ exports). In our study we also take in 
account the environmental issues that affect this behavior. In this frame 
we calculate the best response of the firms by calculating their optimal 
outputs and of the governments by calculating the tariffs they impose on 
the firms. 
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2. International Environmental Problems 
International environmental problems include the decline in fresh-
water and food resources, the proliferation of toxics, global warming, and 
the decimation of biological diversity. Further, in a world with rising 
population pressures and a global economy, precious natural ecosystems 
face profound threats from those who seek abundant resources, cheap 
labor, and weak or poorly enforced environmental standards. Though 
strict domestic regulations can help protect the environment in 
industrialized nations, they may also drive some of the most harmful 
extractive activities to less developed regions1. 
In order to solve these problems, countries have to cooperate by 
signing international agreements. However, this is a very complicated 
process. A main problem is that each country wants to support its 
interests and thus may not participate in such agreements. Another 
important issue is the free-riding behavior by some countries. This means 
that although the countries sign the agreements, some of them finally do 
not take measures to achieve the target, because they let the others to do 
so. 
2.1 The Greenhouse effect 
The most important environmental problem is the climate change, 
which is the heating of the surface of a planet due to the high 
concentration of greenhouse gases. Greenhouse gases are almost 
transparent to solar radiation but strongly absorb and emit infrared 
radiation. Thus, greenhouse gases trap heat within the surface-
troposphere system. This mechanism is fundamentally different from that 
of an actual greenhouse, which works by isolating warm air inside the 
structure so that heat is not lost by convention. 
The Earth receives energy from the sun mostly in the form of visible 
light. The atmosphere is almost transparent to visible light, so that about 
50% of the sun's energy reaches the Earth and is absorbed by the surface. 
Like all bodies with a temperature above absolute zero, the Earth's 
surface radiates energy in the infrared range. Greenhouse gases are not 
transparent to infrared radiation so they absorb it. Infrared radiation is 
absorbed from all directions and is passed as heat to all gases in the 
atmosphere. The atmosphere also radiates in the infrared range (because 
of its temperature, in the same way the Earth's surface does) and does so 
                                                 
1This information is drawn from http://www.aida-americas.org/aida.php?page=problems, the site of 
Interamerican Association for Environmental Defence 
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in all directions. The surface and lower atmosphere are warmed because 
of the greenhouse gases, making our life on earth possible2. 
For the Earth's temperature to be in steady state so that the Earth 
does not rapidly heat or cool, this absorbed solar radiation must be very 
closely balanced by energy radiated back to space in the infrared 
wavelengths. Since the intensity of infrared radiation increases with 
increasing temperature, one can think of the Earth's temperature as being 
determined by the infrared flux needed to balance the absorbed solar flux. 
The visible solar radiation mostly heats the surface, not the atmosphere, 
whereas most of the infrared radiation escaping to space is emitted from 
the upper atmosphere, not the surface. The infrared photons emitted by 
the surface are mostly absorbed in the atmosphere by greenhouse gases 
and clouds and do not escape directly to space. 
The reason this warms the surface is most easily understood by 
starting with a simplified model of a purely radiative greenhouse effect 
that ignores energy transfer in the atmosphere by convection (sensible 
heat transport, sensible heat flux) and by the evaporation and 
condensation of water vapour (latent heat transport, latent heat flux). In 
this purely radiative case, one can think of the atmosphere as emitting 
infrared radiation both upwards and downwards. The upward infrared 
flux emitted by the surface must balance not only the absorbed solar flux 
but also this downward infrared flux emitted by the atmosphere. The 
surface temperature will rise until it generates thermal radiation 
equivalent to the sum of the incoming solar and infrared radiation. 
A very simple model, but one that proves to be remarkably useful, 
involves the assumption that this temperature profile is simply fixed, by 
the non-radiative energy fluxes. Given the temperature at the emission 
level of the infrared flux escaping to space, one then computes the surface 
temperature by increasing temperature at the rate of 6.5 °C per kilometre, 
the environmental lapse rate, until one reaches the surface. The more 
opaque the atmosphere, and the higher the emission level of the escaping 
infrared radiation, the warmer the surface, since one then needs to follow 
this lapse rate over a larger distance in the vertical. While less intuitive 
than the purely radiative greenhouse effect, this less familiar radiative-
                                                 
2
 The information in this paragraph is drawn from the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change Fourth Assessment Report. Chapter 1: Historical overview of 
climate change science, page 97. 
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convective picture is the starting point for most discussions of the 
greenhouse effect in the climate modelling literature. 
2.2 Greenhouse gases 
Greenhouse gases, which mainly consist of water vapour, they are 
essential in helping determine the temperature of the Earth; without them 
this planet would likely be much colder. Although many factors such as 
the sun and the water cycle are responsible for the Earth's weather and 
energy balance, if all else was held equal and stable, the planet's average 
temperature should be considerably lower without greenhouse gases. 
Human activities have an impact upon the level of greenhouse gases 
in the atmosphere, which has other effects upon the system, with their 
own possible repercussions. The 2007 assessment report compiled by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) observed that 
"changes in atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases and aerosols, 
land cover and solar radiation alter the energy balance of the climate 
system", and concluded that "increases in anthropogenic greenhouse gas 
concentrations is very likely to have caused most of the increases in 
global average temperatures since the mid-20th century". 
When gases are ranked by their contribution to the greenhouse 
effect, the most important are3: 
• water vapor, which contributes 36–72% 
• carbon dioxide, which contributes 9–26% 
• methane, which contributes 4–9% 
• ozone, which contributes 3–7% 
The contribution to the greenhouse effect by a gas is affected by 
both the characteristics of the gas and its abundance. For example, on a 
molecule-for-molecule basis methane is about eight times stronger 
greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide, but it is present in much smaller 
concentrations so that its total contribution is smaller. It is not possible to 
state that a certain gas causes an exact percentage of the greenhouse 
effect, because the influences of the various gases are not additive. The 
                                                 
3
 This data is drawn from Kiehl, J. T.; Kevin E. Trenberth (February 1997). "Earth’s 
Annual Global Mean Energy Budget". Bulletin of the American Meteorological 
Society 78 (2): 197–208  
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higher ends of the ranges quoted are for the gas alone; the lower ends, for 
the gas counting overlaps4. 
2.3 Global warming 
A very important environmental problem which results from the 
greenhouse effect and which could threaten the existence of human 
civilization is the global warming. Global warming is the increase in the 
average temperature of the Earth's near-surface air and oceans since the 
mid-20th century and its projected continuation. Global surface 
temperature increased 0.74 ± 0.18 °C (1.33 ± 0.32 °F) during the last 
century5. The IPCC concludes that increasing greenhouse gas 
concentrations resulting from human activity such as fossil fuel burning 
and deforestation are responsible for most of the observed temperature 
increase since the middle of the 20th century. The IPCC also concludes 
that natural phenomena such as solar variation and volcanoes produced 
most of the warming from pre-industrial times to 1950 and had a small 
cooling effect afterward. These basic conclusions have been endorsed by 
more than 45 scientific societies and academies of science, including all 
of the national academies of science of the major industrialized 
countries6. 
Climate model projections summarized in the IPCC report indicate 
that the global surface temperature will probably rise a further 1.1 to 
6.4 °C (2.0 to 11.5 °F) during the twenty-first century5. The uncertainty in 
this estimate arises from the use of models with differing sensitivity to 
greenhouse gas concentrations and the use of different estimates of future 
greenhouse gas emissions. Some other uncertainties include how 
warming and related changes will vary from region to region around the 
globe. Most studies focus on the period up to 2100. However, warming is 
expected to continue beyond 2100 even if anthropogenic emissions stop, 
because of the large heat capacity of the oceans and the long lifetime of 
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere7,8. 
                                                 
4
 This information is drawn from Houghton, John (4 May 2005). Global warming. 
Institute of Physics. p. 1362 
5
 This data is drawn from IPCC (2007-05-04). "Summary for Policymakers". Climate 
Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the 
Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
6
 This information is drawn from Royal Society (2005). "Joint science academies' 
statement: Global response to climate change". 
7
 This information is drawn from Archer, David (2005). "Fate of fossil fuel CO2 in 
geologic time". Journal of Geophysical Research 110 (C9): C09S05.1–C09S05.6.  
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Increasing global temperature will cause sea levels to rise and will 
change the amount and pattern of precipitation, probably including 
expansion of subtropical deserts. The continuing retreat of glaciers, 
permafrost and sea ice is expected, with the Arctic region being 
particularly affected. Other likely effects include shrinkage of the 
Amazon rainforest and Boreal forests, increases in the intensity of 
extreme weather events, species extinctions and changes in agricultural 
yields7. 
3. International Environmental Agreements 
Since global warming is a truly global environmental problem, 
international coordination is necessary. However, countries have to 
voluntarily negotiate and agree upon certain targets and policies to 
achieve these targets, as there is no global coercive authority to enforce 
global climate protection. The problem is that many countries are not 
keen to participate in international environmental agreements because of 
various reasons, such as free riding incentives. 
It is often remarked that international cooperation in trade must hold 
clues for how international cooperation in environmental protection can 
be aided. There are, however, fundamental differences between these 
issues. First, trade is a bilateral activity, even if governed by multilateral 
rules (today, under the World Trade Organization or WTO). The supply 
of global public goods, by contrast, is a multilateral endeavour. 
Sustaining cooperation between just two countries is relatively easy; 
sustaining cooperation among a large number of countries is much harder 
(even increasing the number of countries from two to three makes a 
significant, qualitative difference). Second, trade liberalization is not a 
public good. Non-parties can be excluded from enjoying the benefits of a 
trade agreement (indeed, rather than free ride, trade diversion can make 
non-parties worse off). By contrast, free riding is the most important 
hindrance to international environmental cooperation. 
3.1 Kyoto Protocol 
Probably the most important of these agreements is the Kyoto 
Protocol which was put into effect in February 2005 for the commitment 
period of 2008-2012. It was adopted in December 1997 and was signed 
                                                                                                                                            
8 This information is drawn from Solomon, S., et al. (2009). "Irreversible climate 
change due to carbon dioxide emissions". Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences 106 (6): 1704–1709 
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by developed and developing countries. The implementation of the Kyoto 
targets in greenhouse gas emissions reductions relies on three policy 
instruments:  international emissions’ trading (IET), joint implementation 
(JI) and clean development mechanism (CDM). 
International Emissions’ Trading (or emission trading) is an 
administrative approach used to control pollution by providing economic 
incentives for achieving reductions in the emissions of pollutants. The 
system used in the Kyoto protocol is a cap and trade system. A central 
authority (usually a government or international body) sets a limit or cap 
on the amount of a pollutant that can be emitted. Companies or other 
groups are issued emission permits and are required to hold an equivalent 
number of allowances (or credits, or permits) which represent the right to 
emit a specific amount of the pollutant. The total amount of allowances 
cannot exceed the cap, limiting total emissions to that level. Companies 
that need to increase their emission allowance must buy them from those 
who pollute less. The transfer of allowances is referred to as a trade. In 
effect, the buyer is paying a charge for polluting, while the seller is being 
rewarded for having reduced emissions by more than was needed. Thus, 
in theory, those who can easily reduce emissions most cheaply will do so, 
achieving the pollution reduction at the lowest possible cost to society. 
Market transactions are driven by relative prices of emission 
reduction opportunities among market participants. For example, a 
company with a low cost opportunity to reduce emissions below its 
allocation of emission rights can sell these unneeded rights to a company 
with limited or uneconomic emission reduction opportunities. Emissions 
trading systems have been already used in the United States (the Acid 
Rain Program has been evaluated as very successful) and the European 
Union, which unilaterally has implemented the Kyoto Protocol for the 
period 2005 to 2008. There are other applications, but most of them are in 
a pilot phase (as in the greenhouse gas markets emerging throughout the 
world). 
The overall goal of an emissions trading plan is to reduce emissions. 
The cap is usually lowered over time - aiming towards a national 
emissions reduction target. In other systems a portion of all traded credits 
must be retired, causing a net reduction in emissions each time a trade 
occurs. In many cap and trade systems, organizations which do not 
pollute may also participate, thus environmental groups can purchase and 
retire allowances or credits and hence drive up the price of the remainder 
according to the law of demand. Corporations can also prematurely retire 
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allowances by donating them to a non-profit entity and then be eligible 
for a tax deduction. 
Because emissions’ trading uses markets to determine how to deal 
with the problem of pollution, it is often touted as an example of effective 
free market environmentalism. While the cap is usually set by a political 
process, individual companies are free to choose how or if they will 
reduce their emissions. In theory, firms will choose the least-costly way 
to comply with the pollution regulation, creating incentives that reduce 
the cost of achieving a pollution reduction target. 
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is an arrangement 
under the Kyoto Protocol allowing industrialised countries with a 
greenhouse gas reduction commitment (called Annex B countries) to 
invest in projects that reduce emissions in developing countries as an 
alternative to more expensive emission reductions in their own countries. 
A crucial feature of an approved CDM carbon project is that it has 
established that the planned reductions would not occur without the 
additional incentive provided by emission reductions credits, a concept 
known as "additionality". 
The CDM allows net global greenhouse gas emissions to be reduced 
at a much lower global cost by financing emissions reduction projects in 
developing countries where costs are lower than in industrialized 
countries. However, in recent years, criticism against the mechanism has 
increased. 
The CDM is supervised by the CDM Executive Board (CDM EB) 
and is under the guidance of the Conference of the Parties (COP/MOP) of 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC). 
The purpose of the CDM was defined under Article 12 of the Kyoto 
Protocol. Apart from helping Annex B countries comply with their 
emission reduction commitments, it must assist developing countries in 
achieving sustainable development, while also contributing to 
stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere. 
To prevent industrialised countries from making unlimited use of 
CDM, the framework has a provision that use of CDM be ‘supplemental’ 
to domestic actions to reduce emissions. This wording has led to a wide 
range of interpretations - the Netherlands for example aims to achieve 
half of its required emission reductions by CDM. It treats Dutch 
companies' purchases of European Emissions Trading Scheme 
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allowances from companies in other countries as part of its domestic 
actions. 
Thus, it is significant to detect possible incentives for both 
developed and developing countries, so as to boost them to participate in 
international agreements on climate change. This will get easier if we 
ascertain the strategic implications of the so-called ancillary benefits and 
not only their quantitative and qualitative impacts for climate policy 
levels. 
Joint implementation (JI) is set forth in the Kyoto Protocol to help 
countries with binding greenhouse gas emissions targets (so-called Annex 
I countries) meet their obligations. JI is set forth in Article 6 of the Kyoto 
Protocol. Under Article 6, any Annex I country can invest in emission 
reduction projects (referred to as "Joint Implementation Projects") in any 
other Annex I country as an alternative to reducing emissions 
domestically. In this way countries can lower the costs of complying with 
their Kyoto targets by investing in greenhouse gas reductions in an Annex 
I country where reductions are cheaper, and then applying the credit for 
those reductions towards their commitment goal. 
A JI project might involve, for example, replacing a coal-fired 
power plant with a more efficient combined heat and power plant. Most 
JI projects are expected to take place in so-called "economies in 
transition," noted in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol. Currently Russia and 
Ukraine are slated to host the greatest number of JI projects. Unlike the 
case of the Clean Development Mechanism, the JI has caused less 
concern of spurious emission reductions, as the JI, unlike the CDM, takes 
place in countries which have an emission reduction requirement. 
The process of receiving credit for JI projects is somewhat complex. 
Emission reductions are awarded credits called Emission Reduction Units 
(ERUs), where one ERU represents an emission reduction equaling one 
tone of CO2 equivalent. The ERUs come from the host country's pool of 
assigned emissions credits, known as Assigned Amount Units, or AAUs. 
Each Annex I party has a predetermined amount of AAUs, calculated on 
the basis of its 1990 greenhouse gas emission levels. By requiring JI 
credits to come from a host country's pool of AAUs, the Kyoto Protocol 
ensures that the total amount of emissions credits among Annex I parties 
does not change for the duration of the Kyoto Protocol's first commitment 
period. 
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4. Ancillary Benefits 
The reduction of atmospheric greenhouse gas (GHG) accumulation 
from fuel use would also tend to reduce basic air pollutants and thus, have 
direct local benefits. These benefits are characterized as ancillary. So, 
apart from primary benefits, ancillary benefits must be detected, in order 
to give countries stronger motivation for participation.  
Primary benefits are the benefits derived from pursuing climate 
policy’s primary aim, which is climate stabilization at the global level. In 
contrast, according to the IPCC Third Assessment Report (2001a,b,c), 
ancillary benefits “…are the monetized secondary or side benefits of 
mitigation policies on problems such as reductions in local air pollution 
associated with the reduction of fossil fuels, and possibly indirect effects 
on congestion, land quality, employment and fuel security”. 
They are local benefits generated by climate policy, but are not 
associated directly with the slowing of climate change. They are also 
characterized as co-benefits and spill-over benefits (IPCC (2001)). 
According to Markandya and Rubbelke (2004), the main difference 
between the terms is the relative emphasis given to benefits derived from 
slowing climate change versus other benefits. The types of impacts being 
covered are the same under each of these labels.  
Moreover, ancillary benefits arise almost immediately after the 
climate protection measure has been accomplished, contrary to the 
primary ones which accrue over a time of several decades or longer. “We 
feel the heart of the analysis of ancillary benefits involves the here and 
now that is relevant to individual policy makers in a national context”, as 
Krupnick, Burtraw and Markandya (2000, p.3) mention. Additionally, 
benefits of reduced climate change risks accrue at a global level, while 
ancillary benefits accrue mainly to those countries undertaking mitigation 
action. If we fail to consider ancillary benefits correctly, this could lead to 
a false assessment of the net costs – direct cost of climate policy less 
ancillary benefits from this policy – of mitigation policy, and a wrong 
definition of no regrets levels of GHG mitigation. Finally, the accurate 
estimation of ancillary benefits is important since their underestimation 
could lead to choose an unnecessarily expensive policy. 
No regrets options are by definition GHG emissions reduction 
options that have negative net costs, because they generate direct or 
indirect benefits that are large enough to offset the costs of implementing 
the options. The costs and benefits included in the assessment, in 
principle, are all internal and external impacts of the options. External 
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costs arise when markets fail to provide a link between those who create 
the externality and those affected by it; more generally, when property 
rights for the relevant resources are not well defined. External costs can 
relate to environmental side-impacts, and distortions in markets for 
labour, land, energy resources, and various other areas. 
As the years pass by, international negotiations on climate change 
are in the process of intensive search for a post-Kyoto protocol. During 
these years many changes took place. For example, China is now the 
larger emitter of greenhouse gases (GHG) and it is necessary that 
developing countries participate in such an agreement because of their 
growing emissions. 
Recently, by using normal form games, Pittel and Rubbelke (2008) 
investigated the outcome of international negotiations on climate change 
under two different scenarios: one with and one without the inclusion of 
ancillary benefits. They find that if international negotiations are 
represented as a chicken game, ancillary benefits tend to have a positive 
influence on the propensity of countries to participate in an international 
agreement on climate change. 
4.1 Developing Countries 
Apart from the fact that developing countries’ participation is 
necessary for the success of any international agreement, these countries 
have also their own incentives to participate. At first, their economies will 
be negatively affected by climate change. Given that developing countries 
have limited economic and technological means to adopt to climate 
changes, the negative effect will be larger for these countries. Secondly, 
they can obtain additional local benefits by slowing global warming if 
they participate to climate protection. Aunan et al. (2007), suggests that 
China will gain important ancillary benefits by the climate protection 
commitment because its efforts will lead not only to the reduction of 
GHG emissions but also of particles and NOX emissions. These 
reductions, in turn, will improve public health and will increase 
agricultural yields. 
Smith and Haigler (2008, p.19) recently offered some calculations 
which illustrate the high-degree of ancillary benefit that can result 
especially in improving efficiency in the household energy sector in 
developing countries. As they mention “the poor combustion and lack of 
good ventilation typical in simple household stoves result in high indoor 
and near-household air pollution exposures. This in turn has been 
associated with a range of diseases, with best evidence for pneumonia 
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(acute lower respiratory infections) in children and COPD (chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease) in women, the two groups receiving the 
highest exposures”. 
4.2 Developed Countries 
Ancillary benefits in developed countries may not be equivalent to 
those in developing countries, but they are also significant. In some 
studies they are represented as a multiple of primary benefits. Pearce 
(2000) calculates that ancillary benefits are in the range between 0.07 and 
6.67 of the primary benefits. 
Ekins (1996a, 1996b) suggests that the inclusion of ancillary 
benefits in cost-benefit analyses will increase the optimal climate policy 
levels. Apart from the quantitative, there are also qualitative ancillary 
benefits. The ancillary benefits can only be enjoyed on a local or regional 
scale, while the primary can be enjoyed globally. Put it differently, 
ancillary benefits are mainly a private good from the country’s or 
region’s point of view, whereas climate protection generated by climate 
policy is a global public good. 
In conclusion, on the one hand, ancillary benefits call for higher 
globally optimal abatement levels; while on the other hand, they give 
incentives to countries to participate in international agreements and thus, 
increase the number of participating countries. In the case that ancillary 
benefits are important they reduce the free riding incentives that each 
country has. Free riding benefits are generated from the actions 
undertaken by other countries but these actions cannot generate ancillary 
benefits. 
5. Strategic trade 
Countries often perceive themselves as being in competition with 
each other for profitable international markets. In this case, governments 
seek attractive policy tools, like export subsidies and import tariffs, so as 
to improve the domestic firms’ position in the non-cooperative rivalries 
with foreign firms, enabling them to expand their market share and 
profits.  
As a result, tariffs, taxes and subsidies affect the initial conditions of 
the game played by the firms. While the terms of trade move against the 
subsidizing country, their welfare can increase as price exceeds the 
marginal cost of exports, under imperfect competition. The terms of trade 
is defined as the ratio of the price a country receives for its export 
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commodity to the price it pays for its import commodity. So, when a 
country subsidizes its firms, the price of its exports (numerator of the 
ratio) decreases and thus there is deterioration in its terms of trade. 
Producing countries have incentives to cooperate and eliminate such 
subsidies, but they also have an incentive to cheat on any resulting 
agreements, along the lines of a typical prisoners’ dilemma. 
Brander and Spencer (1984) study export subsidies as a policy 
instrument to promote domestic firms in the international market. As they 
advocate “the central idea is that it is to the advantage of a country to 
capture a large share of the production of profit-earning imperfectly 
competitive industries. Export subsidies can be used to carry out such 
“profit-shifting” policies.  
They use a simple Cournot (or Nash quantity) duopoly. Subsidy 
levels are set by the governments and output levels are set by competing 
firms. Each firm takes as given the output of its rivals and the subsidy 
levels. In a two stage model, governments play first, setting 
simultaneously subsidy levels and then firms choose simultaneously their 
output levels. Therefore, “firms play Nash against all other players, and 
governments play Stackelberg against firms and Nash against other 
governments”. Generally, some distortion is needed for a second best 
policy like subsidies to be in the national interest. The distortion here is 
imperfect competition. 
Also, they assume an economy with identical consumers who 
receive the same income based on identical endowments and an equal 
share of the profits of the imperfectly competitive domestic firm. This is 
the usual assumption in order to abstract from the problem that the 
national distribution of income affects demand and welfare. 
In the model of Brander and Spencer (1984) the domestic and the 
foreign firm sell their product to a third market, so that there is no 
consumption in the producing countries. Therefore, strategic trade 
policies affect only firms’ profits and do not affect domestic consumers’ 
surplus. The reaction functions are downward sloping as marginal 
revenue declines with an increase in the output of the other firm. 
Therefore, an increase in the export subsidy increases domestic exports, 
while a domestic subsidy reduces the output of the foreign firm.  
As regards to the domestic subsidy, it lowers price, increases 
domestic profit and lowers foreign profit. The subsidy actually increases 
domestic welfare net of the subsidy. In their simple case with all 
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production for export, domestic surplus net of the subsidy, is the profit of 
the domestic firm (earned from exports) minus the cost of the subsidy. 
There is a number of works in the literature which apply the 
strategic trade argument developed by B&S (1984) to the choice of 
national environmental targets. Markusen (1975) assumes that all markets 
are competitive, there are no import tariffs and only pollution tariffs can 
be used to affect the terms of trade. As a result, exporting countries over-
internalize environmental damage in order to avoid pollution-related 
tariffs and improve their terms of trade. 
Conrad (1993), Barret (1994) and Kennedy (1994) suggest that 
under Cournot competition, environmental policy can be used to 
indirectly subsidize exports by under-internalizing the environmental 
damage caused from pollution. Conrad (1993), assumes that governments 
are allowed to control pollution through emission taxes but at the same 
time subsidies for pollution intensive inputs may be used. Barrett (1994) 
assumes that governments use emission standards instead of taxes to 
regulate pollution. Finally, Kennedy (1994) studies a two-country closed 
economy model and claims that when pollution is transboundary, the eco-
dumping effect is reinforced. 
The above studies indicate that nations without strict regulatory 
standards attract accelerated flows of international capital investment, 
leading to the creation of “pollution havens.” The lack of stringent 
environmental regulation gives firms an unfair competitive trade 
advantage, amounting to an environmental subsidy which enables firms 
to undercut prices in export markets. 
In a two-good perfectly competitive neoclassical world, a country 
has o incentive to subsidize an exported good, because this action will 
lead to a worsening of the country’s terms of trade. The only case for this 
to happen is if the county can influence the exported price’s good. Then, 
an export tax would be appropriate so as to improve the country’s terms 
of trade. 
As regards the environmental regulation and its effects on the 
competitiveness and the profitability of the firms, there are two 
conflicting arguments; one that refers to the short run and one to the long 
run. 
1. In the short run there is a conflict between environmental 
quality and economic prosperity. Governments use regulations in order to 
internalize the negative externalities caused by the economic system. 
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However, the internalization of externalities requires abatement activities 
and therefore, higher operation costs for the firms.  
2. There is a relation between environmental standards and 
competitiveness in the long run. To explain, firms that invest on 
abatement technology can have in the long run benefits which outweigh 
the short run costs of investment. 
Empirical support is rather neutral about these arguments. However, 
the behaviour of governments, which do not participate in international 
environmental agreements, implies that they act only upon the short-run 
perceived costs of environmental policy. 
Section 6 sets out the basic model and shows the reaction of the 
firms and governments when the ancillary benefits are taken into account. 
Firms may change their output and the number of emission permits they 
have. Governments concern about the taxes that they will impose to the 
firms in order to make them emit less pollutants. In section 7 the 
conclusions are represented. 
6. The model 
We use a simple model in order to demonstrate our results. Consider 
two countries. In each country there is one firm producing a 
homogeneous product. We denote by iq  the output level of firm i , 2,1=i  
and we also assume that both firms supply their product to a third market 
in which there is no other competition. The demand in the third market is 
assumed linear of the form: )( ji qqbaP +−= . The two firms compete a-la 
Cournot-Nash. Firms face a total cost of production iii qcqC =)( , where c  
is a technological parameter representing the constant marginal cost of 
production and is assumed equal across competing firms. 
We further assume that both firms’ production results in emissions 
of a global pollutant and a local pollutant. Emissions of the global 
pollutant are assumed to be increasing with the level of output, 
iiii qlqE =)( , where il , 2,1=i  is a technological parameter representing the 
constant marginal rate of emissions generation. 
7. The choice of local tax level 
We assume that in order to reduce damages from the global 
pollutant, the two countries participate in a global agreement to reduce 
emissions. We assume that the global agreement uses a tradable 
emissions permit policy to achieve its target. According to this policy 
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each government issues a number of permits iW  and distributes them free 
of charge to the home firm i . After the initial distribution, firms can trade 
permits in a competitive market, at a price Pe . Although many firms 
generate the global pollutant and thus, participate in the permits market, 
only the two firms considered here, produce the homogeneous product 
whose market we examine in this study. 
In order to comply with the regulation, firms can either purchase 
permits, or reduce their emissions by engaging in abatement effort iA . 
We assume that abatement is iii qkA = , where ik  is the abatement per unit 
of output. 
Emissions’ abatement is costly. Firms’ total cost of abatement is 
denoted by 2ii Ag , where 0>ig  is a technological parameter expressing the 
marginal cost of abatement of each firm and is different across firms. 
Emissions of the global and the local pollutant are related. For simplicity 
we assume that there is a one to one relationship, that is, the production of 
one unit of output iq  in country i  generates il  units of the global pollutant 
and in the same time il  units of the local pollutant. 
When firms engage in abatement of the global pollutant they also 
reduce the local pollutant and thus, the damages that the local pollutant 
generates. Given that the emission target was agreed upon based on the 
global pollutant’s damages alone, each government has an incentive to 
implement an additional local environmental policy targeting the local 
pollutant. We assume that both countries impose an emission tax per unit 
of emissions discharged into the local environment. 
Thus, if firms engage in abatement, they will produce a double 
benefit; a reduction in the global pollutant and in the same time a 
decrease in the local pollutant. There are also two policy instruments: a 
global tradable permits system and a local environmental tax. 
The firms choose their levels of output iq  and abatement per unit of 
output ik  by maximizing their profits 1Π  and 2Π  
iiiiiiiijii EtWEPeAgcqqqqba −−−−−+−=Π )()]([ 2 ,                          (1) 
where iE  denotes emissions of the global and the local pollutant net 
of abatement, that is, iiiii qkqlE −= , 2,1=i . 
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The first order conditions of the profit maximization are 
0)()(22 2 =−−−−−−−−=Π iiiiiiiijiqi kltklPeqkgcbqbqa ,                (2a) 
02 2 =+−=Π iiiiii
k
i tqqkgPeq .                                                           (2b) 
 
Where superscripts denote derivatives with respect to the choice 
variable. 
Solving the equation (2a) with respect to iq  yields firms’ reaction 
function 
=)( ji qq jiii qb
tlPelca
2
1
2
−
−−−
,                                                           (3) 
 
The second order conditions are. 
0)(2 221 <+−=Π=Π iiqqqq kgb .                                                            (4) 
 
The negative sign of the second order conditions confirms that the 
reaction functions are downward sloping. 
 
The reaction functions of the two firms show the best response of 
the firm to any particular output chosen by its rival. The simultaneous 
solution of equations (3) yields the equilibrium outputs of the two firms: 
                                                                                                                
b
tPeltPelca
q jjiii 3
)()(2 +++−−
=                                                     (5) 
 
Solving equation (2b) with respect to ik  yields the firm i’s 
abatement per unit of output, as a function of its rival’s output, 
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jiii
i
ji bqtPelcag
tPeb
qk
−+−−
+
=                                                        (6) 
 
Substituting the output levels from (5) into (6) we obtain firm i’s 
level of abatement per unit of output as a function of  Pe and it . Then, we 
substitute the output levels 1q  and 2q  from (5) into the emissions and 
abatement functions to derive them as functions of   Pe and it . Finally, we 
derive the total output Q  and the price P  as functions of   Pe and it . 
 
Each government chooses the level of the tax that it will impose by 
maximizing its social welfare while taking into account the behaviour of 
the other government. Each country’s social welfare is expressed as the 
sum of the producer surplus and the ancillary benefits from the reduction 
in emissions. Note that in our model, we do not consider damages from 
global emissions since the problem of the global pollutant is dealt with at 
the international level through the permits system. Moreover, there is no 
domestic consumer surplus because the product is sold to a third market. 
 
Under these assumptions each country’s social welfare function is: 
 
),(]),([
),(),(),(),(),(
jiiiijii
jiiijiijiijijii
ttAdWttEPe
ttAgttcqttqttPttW
+−−
−−=
                                 (7) 
 
where ),( jiii ttAd , 2,1, =ji  expresses the ancillary benefits gained by 
firms’ abatement effort. 
 
We derive the first order conditions with respect to the tax level, 
which then yield the reaction function of each country’s choice of tax to 
the other country’s tax level: 
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As it is shown there is a negative relation between the tariffs 
imposed by the two governments. This means that the higher the tax 
imposed by country i, the lower the tax imposed by country j. So, the 
choice of tariff by one government depends on the tariff imposed by the 
other one. “Each of these tariffs has an impact on the profits of both firms 
and therefore on the net welfare of both countries”, as Brander and 
Spencer (1984) note. This fact explains the behaviour of the governments 
to intervene in the market in order to promote the interest of the local 
firm.  
 
Note that when the other country sets a zero tax, the home country 
will set a higher tax the higher are the ancillary benefits id , the lower is 
the cost of abatement ig , the higher is the permit price, and the lower are 
the per unit expected profits in the international market )( ca − .     
 
Solving the two reaction functions (8) simultaneously yields the 
equilibrium values for the taxes: 
 
jiji
ijjiji
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           (9) 
 
Finally, if we substitute equations (9) into the equations (5) we 
derive the optimal quantities produced by each firm 
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8. Simulations 
In this section we present an analysis based on values which we set 
on the parameters in order to verify the results of the section 7. We also 
present a graph to show the relation between the taxes imposed by the 
two governments. 
The values we set to the parameters are 
64=a , 30c = , 2/3b = , 0.6l 1 = , 0.8l 2 = , 1.6g 1 = , 1.8g 2 = , 6Pe = , 
16d 1 = , 18d 2 = , 16 W1 = , 16 W2 =  
 
The results based on these values are 
12.26111 =t , 3.404172 =t , 9.8051 =q , 14.9552 =q , 0.5820091 =k , 
0.1746752 =k , 5.70661 =A , 2.612272 =A , 0.1764031 =E , 9.351732 =E  
 
As it is shown, the results confirm what arise from the equations in 
section 7. Governments intervene strategically to the market by imposing 
taxes. The firms’ outputs are also influenced. The values of il  and ik , 
2,1=i  are also valid as ii kl > , because otherwise the results would make 
no sense. Finally, abatement and emission values are positive, which is 
according to what we assume above. 
In order to provide another view of our outcome, we present Figure 
1. The axes of the graph represent the taxes imposed by the two 
governments. In section 7 we note that the functions of the taxes are 
downward sloping and this conclusion is verified at the graph. The 
reaction functions of the taxes are downward sloping and they are 
intersected, which means that there is a solution to the problem.  
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9. Conclusions 
This paper analyzes governments’ optimal intervention policies and 
strategic behavior and firms’ optimal emission and output amounts when 
international emissions trading and environmental taxes implementation 
exist. It is found that considering firms’ ancillary benefits of abatement 
would affect governments’ optimal intervention policies directly. 
We expect all the variables be positive, something that is verified in 
the model through the reaction functions and the values set to the 
parameters. Governments set taxes on per unit of emissions, and firms 
react by reducing their output. As emissions are positively related to the 
firms’ output, they also decrease. On the contrary, abatement increases, 
which is reasonable. 
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This paper adds to the previous literature as we examine a more 
specific model and try to find values of the variables we use, like optimal 
taxation and ancillary benefits. Bearing in mind the aim to calculate the 
taxes, outputs, abatement and emissions, we find that a $12.26 per unit of 
emissions tax imposed by government 1 would yield 9.8 units of the 
output produced by the firm 1, while a 3.4 per unit of emissions tax 
imposed by government 2 would yield 14.9 units of firm’s 2 output. 
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